The Diplomat, an online international news magazine covering politics,society and culture in the Asia- Pacific, on June 24, published anarticle about China’s land reclamation in the East Sea, internationallyknown as the South China Sea.
The article “The truth about‘aggression’ in the South China Sea” was written by Nguyen Hong Thao, anAssistant Professor in Law at the National University of Hanoi,Vietnam. Thao, who also serves at the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, haspointed out that China’s bases are clearly of an offensive nature andthreaten regional peace and stability. This is why the United States,the G7 and other countries have felt compelled to protest. Vietnam NewsAgency would like to introduce the full text of the article:
Satellite images showing the extent of land reclamation of China andVietnam in South China Sea have sparked debates about who the biggestaggressor is and what the status quo is.
To be specific, conceptof “aggression” is mentioned in the Resolution 3314 of United NationsGeneral Assembly on the 14th of December, 1972. Aggression is the use ofarmed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrityor political independence of another State, or in any other mannerinconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. The aggressedNation has the right to defend itself.
The recent landreclamation work in South China Sea is tied closely to the issue ofsovereignty claims. Historical evidence proves that Vietnam has been thefirst state to have administration over the Spratly and Paracel Islandsdating back to at least the 17th century. China, by contrast, only tookinterest in the Paracels in 1909 and claimed them as the southernterminus of its land in 1932. China was also the last country to setfoot in the Spratlys in 1988 after using force to shoot down threeVietnamese ships and brutally massacring 64 Vietnamese without anyweapons in their hands. The Philippines took interest in Spratlys at theend of 1950s, while Malaysia was attending to the southern part ofthese islands in 1980s.
The first step that any sovereign statewhich has gotten attacked by force would take is reinforcing itsgarrisons to prevent any violation of its sovereignty. In 1988, Vietnamincreased its troops on 21 features in the Spratlys and clearly informedthe world that it was doing so. The Philippines has stationed troops on8 features, China on 9, and Taiwan on 1. Malaysia has increased itsoccupation from 3 in 1980 to 5 features in 1999.
In his recentarticle for The Diplomat, Greg Austin wrote that: “By 2015, according tothe United States government, Vietnam occupied 48 features and Chinaoccupied eight”. First, Austin misquoted from the remarks of U.S.Assistant Secretary of Defense, David Shear, on May 13, 2015. Shearactually said that “Vietnam has 48 outposts,” but Austin reported it as“features” instead of “outposts” in the initial part of his piece.
Second,it is important to look more closely at the nature of Vietnamesebehavior in the South China Sea beyond just that statistic. Forinstance, in 1995, in order to minimize tensions and create favorableconditions for the settlement of disputes, Vietnam was the first one tocall on other countries of concern to preserve the status quo. Moregenerally, Vietnam tends to limit the ‘outposts’ on its features toinclude only some observation points to ensure proper administration aswell as security from foreign invasion. For example, on Barque CanadaShoal (Bai Thuyen Chai), which is 17 nautical miles long and 3 nauticalmiles wide, Vietnam has a garrison in the center and two observationoutposts in the two termini of the shoal.
Given this, it is quiteunfair to compare Vietnam’s activities in the South China Sea with thatof China’s. According to comments by General Phung Quang Thanh, on June1, 2015, Vietnam still maintains outposts in 9 islands and 12 reefs.But having several outposts in one natural feature is not likereclaiming land to create a feature many times larger than its originalsize to build a military complex, as China is doing.
Third, it isimportant to distinguish China’s activities from that of otherclaimants and be clear about the consequences of Beijing’s actions. Theconstruction by Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia started all beforethe conclusion of the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the SouthChina Sea signed between China and ASEAN in 2002. They havesimilarities: they are being undertaken in islands and reefs naturallysurrounded by water at high tide; they aim to prevent erosion andimprove the standard of living, they include materials being transportedfrom mainland; they occur on features which are being increasinglycivilized and starting to open for tourism; they do not include heavyweapons; they are meant for defense rather than creating military basesthat can threat other nations; and they are not changing nature of thefeature.
The land reclamation made by China on the low tideelevations (LTE) far from the Chinese mainland, which is approximately1000km, has started since 1988 and has occurred at a very fast pace andhuge scale. Satellite images show that China has been expanding the landreclamation area from 20 hectares to 810 hectares. In Subi, an LTE, thespeed of land reclamation from May to June 2015 is 8 hectares per day,transforming the LTE to a military base of around 3.87 square kilometerscapable of building an airfield strip of about 3km. Remember that thewhole area encompassing all islands and reefs in Spratlys is not morethan 10 square kilometers, stretched over the sea area which is about160,000 to 180,000 square kilometers.
Besides the scale of theseactivities, China’s actions are also negatively impacting the region andinfringing on international law. China uses the biggest dredge ships inthe world to destroy the coral reef ecosystem for extracted material.This damages over 300 hectares of coral reef, creating initial loss ofmore than $100 million every year for countries in South China Sea, inaddition of course to the damage to the environment which. And as manyothers have pointed out, China’s transformation of LTEs into artificialislands, followed by demands by the international community to give themthe legal status of natural islands and recognize a 12 nautical mileterritorial sea and even a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone,violated the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)which China is a party to.
In contrast, Vietnam’s landreclamation is only 0.2% of China’s land reclamation made as of March2015. China has declared that construction work in these LTEs is in theinterest of marine protection, marine science research, and SAR (searchand rescue). However, above all, they are designed to be military basesequipped with heavy guns, ports and airfields. The consequences of thisare quite dire. Given the extent and speed of Chinese land reclamation,the world has reason to worry about the threat to freedom of navigation,at least around 12 nautical miles from Chinese construction.Furthermore, these bases can serve as departure points for Chinese coastguard, navy, and fishery inspection forces to drive away, shoot, lootand rob Malaysian, Filipino, and Vietnamese fishing boats, all the whileslowly establishing a ban on fishing in the area and advancing thenine-dash line claim in the South China Sea.
China’s bases areclearly of an offensive nature and threaten regional peace andstability. This is why the United States, the G7 and other countrieshave felt compelled to protest. If China continues its activities in theSouth China Sea, this has the potential trigger an arms race in theregion as smaller nations feel they need to invest more in weapons asthe only guarantee of their security and sovereignty. Because in theSouth China Sea, China seems to not only be violating international law,but setting its own rules.-VNA
The article “The truth about‘aggression’ in the South China Sea” was written by Nguyen Hong Thao, anAssistant Professor in Law at the National University of Hanoi,Vietnam. Thao, who also serves at the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, haspointed out that China’s bases are clearly of an offensive nature andthreaten regional peace and stability. This is why the United States,the G7 and other countries have felt compelled to protest. Vietnam NewsAgency would like to introduce the full text of the article:
Satellite images showing the extent of land reclamation of China andVietnam in South China Sea have sparked debates about who the biggestaggressor is and what the status quo is.
To be specific, conceptof “aggression” is mentioned in the Resolution 3314 of United NationsGeneral Assembly on the 14th of December, 1972. Aggression is the use ofarmed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrityor political independence of another State, or in any other mannerinconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. The aggressedNation has the right to defend itself.
The recent landreclamation work in South China Sea is tied closely to the issue ofsovereignty claims. Historical evidence proves that Vietnam has been thefirst state to have administration over the Spratly and Paracel Islandsdating back to at least the 17th century. China, by contrast, only tookinterest in the Paracels in 1909 and claimed them as the southernterminus of its land in 1932. China was also the last country to setfoot in the Spratlys in 1988 after using force to shoot down threeVietnamese ships and brutally massacring 64 Vietnamese without anyweapons in their hands. The Philippines took interest in Spratlys at theend of 1950s, while Malaysia was attending to the southern part ofthese islands in 1980s.
The first step that any sovereign statewhich has gotten attacked by force would take is reinforcing itsgarrisons to prevent any violation of its sovereignty. In 1988, Vietnamincreased its troops on 21 features in the Spratlys and clearly informedthe world that it was doing so. The Philippines has stationed troops on8 features, China on 9, and Taiwan on 1. Malaysia has increased itsoccupation from 3 in 1980 to 5 features in 1999.
In his recentarticle for The Diplomat, Greg Austin wrote that: “By 2015, according tothe United States government, Vietnam occupied 48 features and Chinaoccupied eight”. First, Austin misquoted from the remarks of U.S.Assistant Secretary of Defense, David Shear, on May 13, 2015. Shearactually said that “Vietnam has 48 outposts,” but Austin reported it as“features” instead of “outposts” in the initial part of his piece.
Second,it is important to look more closely at the nature of Vietnamesebehavior in the South China Sea beyond just that statistic. Forinstance, in 1995, in order to minimize tensions and create favorableconditions for the settlement of disputes, Vietnam was the first one tocall on other countries of concern to preserve the status quo. Moregenerally, Vietnam tends to limit the ‘outposts’ on its features toinclude only some observation points to ensure proper administration aswell as security from foreign invasion. For example, on Barque CanadaShoal (Bai Thuyen Chai), which is 17 nautical miles long and 3 nauticalmiles wide, Vietnam has a garrison in the center and two observationoutposts in the two termini of the shoal.
Given this, it is quiteunfair to compare Vietnam’s activities in the South China Sea with thatof China’s. According to comments by General Phung Quang Thanh, on June1, 2015, Vietnam still maintains outposts in 9 islands and 12 reefs.But having several outposts in one natural feature is not likereclaiming land to create a feature many times larger than its originalsize to build a military complex, as China is doing.
Third, it isimportant to distinguish China’s activities from that of otherclaimants and be clear about the consequences of Beijing’s actions. Theconstruction by Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia started all beforethe conclusion of the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the SouthChina Sea signed between China and ASEAN in 2002. They havesimilarities: they are being undertaken in islands and reefs naturallysurrounded by water at high tide; they aim to prevent erosion andimprove the standard of living, they include materials being transportedfrom mainland; they occur on features which are being increasinglycivilized and starting to open for tourism; they do not include heavyweapons; they are meant for defense rather than creating military basesthat can threat other nations; and they are not changing nature of thefeature.
The land reclamation made by China on the low tideelevations (LTE) far from the Chinese mainland, which is approximately1000km, has started since 1988 and has occurred at a very fast pace andhuge scale. Satellite images show that China has been expanding the landreclamation area from 20 hectares to 810 hectares. In Subi, an LTE, thespeed of land reclamation from May to June 2015 is 8 hectares per day,transforming the LTE to a military base of around 3.87 square kilometerscapable of building an airfield strip of about 3km. Remember that thewhole area encompassing all islands and reefs in Spratlys is not morethan 10 square kilometers, stretched over the sea area which is about160,000 to 180,000 square kilometers.
Besides the scale of theseactivities, China’s actions are also negatively impacting the region andinfringing on international law. China uses the biggest dredge ships inthe world to destroy the coral reef ecosystem for extracted material.This damages over 300 hectares of coral reef, creating initial loss ofmore than $100 million every year for countries in South China Sea, inaddition of course to the damage to the environment which. And as manyothers have pointed out, China’s transformation of LTEs into artificialislands, followed by demands by the international community to give themthe legal status of natural islands and recognize a 12 nautical mileterritorial sea and even a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone,violated the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)which China is a party to.
In contrast, Vietnam’s landreclamation is only 0.2% of China’s land reclamation made as of March2015. China has declared that construction work in these LTEs is in theinterest of marine protection, marine science research, and SAR (searchand rescue). However, above all, they are designed to be military basesequipped with heavy guns, ports and airfields. The consequences of thisare quite dire. Given the extent and speed of Chinese land reclamation,the world has reason to worry about the threat to freedom of navigation,at least around 12 nautical miles from Chinese construction.Furthermore, these bases can serve as departure points for Chinese coastguard, navy, and fishery inspection forces to drive away, shoot, lootand rob Malaysian, Filipino, and Vietnamese fishing boats, all the whileslowly establishing a ban on fishing in the area and advancing thenine-dash line claim in the South China Sea.
China’s bases areclearly of an offensive nature and threaten regional peace andstability. This is why the United States, the G7 and other countrieshave felt compelled to protest. If China continues its activities in theSouth China Sea, this has the potential trigger an arms race in theregion as smaller nations feel they need to invest more in weapons asthe only guarantee of their security and sovereignty. Because in theSouth China Sea, China seems to not only be violating international law,but setting its own rules.-VNA
